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This conference talk from CPP 2025 presents research on formally verified methods to protect C programs against hardware fault injection attacks. Learn how researchers Basile Pesin, Sylvain Boulmé, David Monniaux, and Marie-Laure Potet implemented and verified software countermeasures in the CompCert verified compiler. Discover their approach to modeling fault attacks—malicious hardware manipulations that alter software behavior through electromagnetic or laser pulses—and how they developed control flow protection mechanisms as program transformations over CompCert's RTL intermediate representation. The presentation covers formal proofs demonstrating that these countermeasures maintain program behavior during normal execution while effectively catching or neutralizing attacks during fault injection. The researchers also share evaluation results using the Lazart symbolic fault injection tool and discuss the performance impact of their security optimizations. This 34-minute talk is particularly relevant for those working in cryptography services, authentication, boot-loaders, or firmware security.
