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Explore a 23-minute IEEE conference talk on advanced auction theory, focusing on improved truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. Delve into the research presented by Sepehr Assadi and Sahil Singla as they discuss innovative approaches to designing more efficient and truthful auction mechanisms in complex combinatorial settings. Gain insights into the challenges and solutions for optimizing auction outcomes when dealing with submodular bidder preferences, and understand the potential implications for various applications in economics, computer science, and market design.
Syllabus
Improved Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders
Taught by
IEEE FOCS: Foundations of Computer Science