Class Central is learner-supported. When you buy through links on our site, we may earn an affiliate commission.

Yale University

Backward Induction: Chess, Strategies, and Credible Threats in Game Theory - Lecture 15

Yale University via YouTube

Start learning Write review
Boot.dev Ad

Learn Backend Development Part-Time, Online

Learn More → CodeSignal Ad

2,000+ Free Courses with Certificates: Coding, AI, SQL, and More

Learn More →

Overview

Google, IBM & Meta Certificates – 40% Off
One Coursera Plus subscription covers most Professional Certificates on Coursera.
Unlock All Certificates
This lecture introduces Zermelo’s theorem and its inductive proof, then defines perfect-information games and strategies for analyzing Nash equilibria in sequential games, including noncredible threats.

Syllabus

- Chapter 1. First and Second Mover Advantages: Zermelo's Theorem.
- Chapter 2. Zermelo's Theorem: Proof.
- Chapter 3. Zermelo's Theorem: Generalization.
- Chapter 4. Zermelo's Theorem: Games of Induction.
- Chapter 5. Games of Perfect Information: Definition.
- Chapter 6. Games of Perfect Information: Economic Example.

Taught by

YaleCourses

Tags

Reviews

Start your review of Backward Induction: Chess, Strategies, and Credible Threats in Game Theory - Lecture 15

Start learning

Never Stop Learning.

Get personalized course recommendations, track subjects and courses with reminders, and more.

Sign up for free
Someone learning on their laptop while sitting on the floor.